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Summary – The turn to the use of mixed qualitative and quantitative (Q-Squared) 
methods in the analysis of poverty is a welcome development with large potential 
payoffs. While the benefits of mixing are not in doubt, the tensions involved in so doing 
have not received adequate attention. The aim of this paper is to address this gap in the 
“Q-Squared” literature. It argues that there are important differences between approaches 
to poverty which operate at the levels of epistemology and normative theory. These 
differences have implications for the numerical transformation of data, the selection of 
validity criteria, and the conception/dimension of poverty adopted and interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being. 
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Ravi Kanbur and Paul Shaffer 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, increasing attention has focused on using mixed qualitative and 
quantitative (Q-Squared) methods in the analysis of poverty. A number of conferencesi 
have been devoted to this issue and a growing body of work has accumulatedii. The articles 
in this Symposium are examples. They were among a dozen or so empirical examples of 
Best Practice in combining approaches to poverty analysis selected for a conference held at 
the University of Toronto in May 2004 entitled “Q-Squared in Practice: Combining 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches to Poverty Analysis”.  The conference is the 
second in a series of the “Q-Squared initiative”, which aims to promote a better integration 
of “qualitative” and “quantitative” approaches to the analysis of poverty. 
 This recent rediscovery of mixed methods in poverty analysis is a welcome 
development with large potential payoffs in terms of understanding and explaining poverty. 
There are many examples of value-added associated with mixing found in the contributions 
                                                 
* Introduction to a Symposium, “Q-Squared in Practice,” in World Development. Contributions to this 
Symposium were initially presented at a conference at the Centre for International Studies, University of 
Toronto, May 15-16 2004 entitled “Q-Squared in Practice: Experiences of Combining Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches in Poverty Analysis”. We are grateful to the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC), Canada, the Department for International Development (DFID), U.K., the USAID-funded 
Strategies for Growth and Access (SAGA) project and the Poverty, Inequality and Development Initiative at 
Cornell University for financial support. 
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 to this Symposium, such as the use of “qualitative” information to: improve household 
survey design (Kozel and Parker, Jha et al.); interpret counterintuitive or surprising 
findings from household surveys (Kozel and Parker, Sharp); explain the reasons behind 
observed outcomes (London et al., Adato et al.); probe motivations underlying observed 
behavior (Place et al., Rew et al.); suggest the direction of causality (Place et al.); assess the 
validity of quantitative results (Barahona and Levy); better understand conceptual 
categories such as labor, the household etc. (Adato et al.); facilitate analysis of locally 
meaningful categories of social differentiation (Howe and McKay, Hargreaves et al., Rew 
et al.);  provide a dynamic dimension to one-off household survey data (Howe and 
McKay), etc.  
 In our view, the benefits of mixing are not in doubt. It does seem however, that the 
tensions involved in so doing have not received adequate attention. There is a tendency to 
underplay differences between approaches and consequent difficulties in fruitfully 
combining them.iii As Appadurai (1989) argued in the context of a similar debate fifteen 
years ago, a certain “ecumenism” has characterized the Q-Squared debate with differences 
between approaches viewed in technical terms, amenable to technical solutions.  
 The aim of this paper is to address this gap in the “Q-Squared” literature. It argues 
that there are important differences between approaches to poverty which operate at the 
levels of epistemology and normative theory.iv These differences have implications for the 
numerical transformation of data, the selection of validity criteria, the conception/ 
dimension of poverty adopted and interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The Q-Squared 
initiative ends up embroiled in these issues because the quest of broadening the 
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 methodological framework tends to bring out contrasting perspectives which go well 
beyond differences of method.  
 The format of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a critical assessment of an 
initial attempt to unpack the qualitative/quantitative distinction into five dimensions of 
difference. Section 3 directs attention to epistemological differences between approaches to 
poverty with implications for numerical transformation of data and validity criteria. Section 
4 addresses contrasting traditions of normative theory with implications for the conception 
of poverty adopted. Throughout, the contributions in this Symposium, as well as other 
materials, are used to illustrate the above issues.v
 
2. A TYPOLOGY 
 At the first Q-Squared Conference at Cornell University in 2002, entitled 
Qualitative and Quantitative Poverty Appraisal: Complementarities, Tensions and the Way 
Forward, considerable attention was devoted to definitional and conceptual issues relating 
the qualitative/quantitative distinction. Conference participants had different views on how 
the “qual/quant” divide should be conceptualised though all agreed that a finer set of 
categories was required to capture its many dimensions. One such typology of differences 
was proposed by Kanbur (2003) building upon, and adding to, a number of the schemas 
presented. It is based on the following five dimensions: 
1. Type of Information on Population: Non-Numerical to Numerical. 
2. Type of Population Coverage: Specific to General. 
3. Type of Population Involvement: Active to Passive. 
4. Type of Inference Methodology: Inductive to Deductive. 
5. Type of Disciplinary Framework: Broad Social Sciences to Neo-classical 
Economics. 
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  This typology helps by clarifying terminology and spelling out exactly what is 
being distinguished.  As such, it has served the purpose for which it was developed. 
Nevertheless, the schema does raise a number of issues concerning both the distinctions 
themselves as well as their derivation from foundational categories. A review of the five 
distinctions illustrates the point. 
 First, the numerical/non-numerical distinction has cutting power. While it is 
possible to numerically transform almost any type of information by counting, scaling, 
ranking, etc., there are important differences in the numerical transformation process 
between types of data (see Section 3 below).  Further, as discussed below, the distinction 
between data-types is likely related to epistemological differences between traditions of 
inquiry in the social sciences.  
 The second distinction, between specific and general population coverage, is 
arguably more incidental than essential to the qual/quant divide. Just about any research 
technique, qualitative or quantitative, may be conducted in few or many sites. Fixed-
response questionnaires may be applied in a single site and detailed ethnographies may be 
conducted over a range of sites to attempt to draw conclusions over a broader population.vi 
Further, the content of household surveys and focus group or interview guides can be 
modified to be more or less context specific. This issue of scale depends primarily on three 
considerations: i) the purpose of the research, i.e. whether results are required to be 
“representative” of a broader population, say to inform decision making at regional or 
national levels; ii) the nature of the extrapolation exercise, i.e. whether statistical inference 
is being used to extrapolate results, which implies some type of probabilistic sampling and 
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 a minimum sample size; iii) practical considerations related to cost and standardisation, 
which tend to favour fixed-response questionnaires for “large n” studies.  
 Third, the active/passive distinction is derivative of a standard distinction in the 
philosophy of social science between “critical” and “other” traditions of inquiry. Critical 
traditions of social science argue for an essential link between theory and practice and 
maintain that emancipation, enlightenment or empowerment is a central feature of the 
research exercise (Fay, 1987). There is wide disagreement; however, about the alleged 
empowering import of different approaches to poverty, in particular the “participatory 
poverty approach”. Its claims to empowerment have been vigorously contested (see Rew et 
al., this issue). This distinction will not be pursued below. 
 Fourth, the inductive/deductive dichotomy hinges on what exactly is meant by these 
terms. All poverty approaches rely heavily on theoretical frameworks whether implicit or 
explicit. Further, understanding social phenomena is always a process of moving back and 
forth between theoretical concepts and empirical information. The distinction correctly 
directs attention to the fact that qualitative approaches tend to be less axiomatic and more 
reliant on contextually generated categories than quantitative approaches. As such, they are 
closer to the “grounded theory” tradition of theory construction advocated by some (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967).  Typically, however, induction is not defined in this way (Miller, 2003).  
 Fifth, the disciplinary distinction between neo-classical economics and “the rest,” 
seems to underplay important quantitative traditions within the various social science 
disciplines. There are arguably greater methodic affinities than differences between neo-
classical economists and rational choice political scientists, sociologists schooled in the 
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 Lazarsfeld tradition of surveying and model-buildingvii, “cliometric” historians, etc 
(Abbott, 2001). It is likely that this disciplinary distinction requires further unpacking. 
 
3. EPISTEMOLOGY 
 Arguably, some of the elements of the typology put forward by Kanbur (2003), as 
well as other differences between approaches to poverty analysis, derive from 
epistemology. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which studies the nature and 
claims of knowledge. Differences in epistemological approach underlie a standard 
distinction in the philosophy of social science between empiricism/positivism, 
hermeneutics/interpretive approaches and critical theory/critical hermeneutics (Braybrooke, 
1987; Fay, 1975).  
 These programs may be defined in different ways. We define empiricism as a 
research approach predicated on an observation-based model for determining the truth or 
validity of knowledge claims in which “brute data” are assigned a special role. The 
meaning of “brute data” will be explained below. It should be noted that the term 
empiricism is used in a particular sense which differs from its more general sense of being 
based on experience or experiential knowledge.  
 Hermeneutics is generally defined as the interpretative understanding of 
intersubjective meanings. Critical hermeneutics adds two dimensions to this central thesis: 
i) first, understanding entails critical assessment of given beliefs and perceptions involving 
some underlying conception of truth or validity; ii) second, emancipation, enlightenment or 
empowerment is an essential part of the process of inquiry. We will define the critical 
hermeneutic tradition as one predicated on a discourse-based model for establishing the 
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 truth or validity of knowledge claims which assigns a special role to “intersubjective 
meanings”. As discussed above, we omit the emancipatory/empowering component from 
this definition because the potential “empowering” role of different poverty approaches is 
widely contested.  
 We argue that there are important links between empiricism and the consumption 
poverty approach, the “gold standard” in applied poverty analysis in the developing world 
(e.g. Ravallion, 1994). This approach is an amalgam of two variants of utility theory, 
revealed preference theory and money metric utility, and nutrition science. More 
specifically, poverty is conceived as the non-fulfilment of basic preferences. The 
“preference” part is due to the fact that consumer preferences over goods and services, 
known by observing consumer behaviour or asking about consumer choices (revealed 
preference theory) are the building blocks from which levels of well-being and poverty are 
derived.  Nutrition science is used to distinguish between “basic” and “non-basic” 
preferences, as the poverty line is usually anchored on minimal levels of dietary energy, or 
caloric, intake (Ravallion, 1994). Poverty is given a numeric representation in that 
preferences are represented by consumption expenditure (money metric utility) which 
facilitates the aggregation of persons or households below the poverty line and 
comparisons of well-being across persons or households. All of these aspects of 
consumption poverty are closely related to empiricism. 
 Important linkages are also found between the critical hermeneutic tradition, as 
defined above, and those approaches to poverty which rely heavily on dialogic techniques, 
such as focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews and life histories to come to an 
understanding of poverty. One example is the participatory approach to poverty, which has 
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 been increasingly applied for empirical poverty analysis in the developing world since the 
mid-nineties through the use of “participatory poverty assessments” (e.g. Narayan et al., 
2002).viii Some social anthropological approaches to poverty also exemplify this tradition, 
though to a lesser extent.ix  In both cases, poverty analysis involves interpreting perceptions 
of the meaning and causes of poverty as revealed by participants in dialogue. 
 The discussion which follows addresses epistemological differences between 
empiricism and critical hermeneutics which relate to: i) units of knowledge and ii) truth or 
validity criteria.  The first difference, which contrasts “brute data” with “intersubjective 
meanings,” is applied to the distinction between numerical and non-numerical data and 
illustrated using the contribution by Hargreaves et al. in the Symposium. The second 
distinction, which contrasts observation-based validity criteria and “discursive” validity 
criteria, is illustrated by views presented in the referee reports on contributions to the 
Symposium.  
 
Units of Knowledge and Numerical Transformation 
 Brute data have played a critically important role in both empiricism and the 
consumption approach to poverty as the bedrock of knowledge and arbiter of validity 
claims. Originally, they were conceived of as sense data, “the things that are immediately 
known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so 
on” (Russell, [1912] 1952, p. 12). Sense-data began to lose its central importance in 
empiricist circles following the sustained critiques of Popper and some of the twentieth 
century logical positivists, primarily Neurath and Carnap (Ayer, 1959: 13, pp. 17-21). 
Three key factors led to their demise: (1) the realization that sense-data were far from 
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 infallible or “incorrigible” (Ibid, p. 20); (2) the rejection of the view that all objects could 
be translated into actual or possible sensations (Nagel, 1961, pp. 121-125); and critically, 
(3) the recognition that public, inter-subjective knowledge claims cannot be based on 
private sensations (Putnam, 1981, p. 181). As a result, intersubjective observability became 
a defining characteristic of brute data. 
 Intersubjective observability meets the last objection to sense data by establishing 
the subject-invariance of properties or qualities of objects. Harré (1985: 159) paraphrases 
this requirement:   “many qualities [of objects] vary with the state of the subject, the 
perceiver, while for scientific purposes we should choose those qualities which are subject 
invariant”. In this revised sense then, brute data are physical, intersubjectively observable 
and subject-invariant. An authoritative statement of the new conception of brute data  is 
provided by Popper (1959, p. 103) in his discussion of “basic statements” “… a basic 
statement must also satisfy a material requirement … this event must be an ‘observable’ 
event; that is to say, basic statements must be testable, inter-subjectively, by 'observation'” 
 What are the implications for poverty analysis? A major preoccupation of the 
consumption approach to poverty has been to base its core elements on intersubjectively 
observable data. Nutrition science aimed to set a minimal level of basic human needs in an 
intersubjectively observable way (based on the calorie content of different foods and 
calorie use in different types of activities by different categories of persons).xRevealed 
preference theory was expressly intended to make preferences intersubjectively observable, 
whereas money metric utility sought to facilitate intersubjectively observable comparisons 
of welfare. In other words, the derivation of the poverty line, interpersonal comparisons of 
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 well-being, and the revelation of preferences are all conducted in intersubjectively 
observable fashion.  
 In the critical hermeneutic tradition, the core unit of knowledge shifts from brute 
data to intersubjective meanings. We define intersubjective meanings as the core 
categories, beliefs and values which give sense to social phenomena and meaning to social 
action.  Putnam (1981, pp. 201-202) provides a good example: 
Take the sentence 'the cat is on the mat'. We have the category 'cat' 
because we regard the division of the world into animals and non-animals 
as significant, and we are further interested in what species a given animal 
belongs to… We have the category 'mat' because we regard the division of 
inanimate things into artifacts and non-artifacts as significant, and we are 
further interested in the purpose and nature a particular artifact has ... We 
have the category 'on' because we are interested in spatial relations … 
Notice what we have: we took the most banal statement imaginable, 'the 
cat' is on the mat', and we found that the presuppositions which make this 
statement a relevant [or meaningful] one in certain contexts include the 
significance of the categories animate/inanimate, purpose and space.  
 
 This concept of “intersubjective meanings” is central to the fundamental claim of 
hermeneutics and critical hermeneutics that social phenomena are “intrinsically 
meaningful”. That is, social phenomena depend for their existence, and/or significance, on 
the meanings ascribed to them by members of society. Phenomena such as poverty, are 
constituted, in part, by the intersubjective meanings given to them and interpreted by social 
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 actors, including researchers. Accordingly, explaining the social world is to undertake a 
“double hermeneutic” analysis, i.e. to interpret a world which is pre-interpreted by social 
agents (Giddens, 1976, p. 162).Failure to do so imposes severe restrictions on social 
inquiry: “we interpret all other societies in the categories of our own” (Taylor 1985, p. 42). 
 For the hermeneutic and critical hermeneutic traditions, accessing this pre-
interpreted world “fundamentally requires participation in a process of reaching 
understanding” (Habermas 1984, p. 112). Participation is necessary because it is the only 
way to come to an understanding of intersubjective meanings. Interpreting individual 
responses to say, attitudinal questionnaire surveys, without a prior understanding of their 
intersubjective meaning referents simply imposes our conceptual categories on everyone 
else (Sayer 1984, pp. 33-35).  
 A core objective of the participatory poverty approach and much of applied social 
anthropological analysis of poverty, is to better understand what is meant by poverty, what 
categories are considered relevant when thinking about well-being, what types of social 
relationships are important when analyzing social change, etc. Typically, inquiry of this 
sort involves dialogic processes such as focus groups, semi-structured interviews, etc. 
These approaches to poverty are not only about intersubjective meanings generated in 
dialogue but they are predicated on an understanding of such, which is at the core of all 
subsequent analysis.   
 There is a particular affinity between brute data and numeric information. Brute-
data are quantities of some sort for which there is often a close mapping onto a numeric 
scale. For example, consumption can be viewed in terms of quantities of goods purchased 
or consumed, or money, all of which are already represented numerically. In these cases, a 
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 close mapping exists between the social phenomenon in question, consumption, and a 
numeric scale (grams/kilos, kilo-calories or money). Intersubjective meanings may be 
numerically transformed through scaling, ranking or other techniques. The properties of the 
ensuing numerical data, however, are different as is their policy relevance. An example 
from the Symposium illustrates this point.  
 In the consumption poverty approach, “utility” is the chosen dimension of well-
being. It is equated with preference fulfillment and rendered observable by restricting 
preferences to consumer preferences revealed by choice (recorded in consumption modules 
in household surveys). These are subsequently transformed into consumption expenditure, 
or money. This process facilitates “subject-invariance” in that any two “competent” 
persons should be able to rank individuals in the same way once this money metric 
criterion has been adopted. Money becomes a representation of well-being or poverty 
which subsequently facilitates the aggregation of those below the poverty line as well as 
consistent interpersonal comparisons of well-being.xi The key point is that the wellbeing 
metric itself, utility, is transformed into an intersubjectively observable datum, revealed 
preferences, to which an “empirical” scale, money, is applied.   
 In the participatory approach, well-being rankings are often used to generate 
numbers of the poor, which are sometimes compared across sites. An innovative example is 
the contribution by Hargreaves et al. in this Symposium. To simplify, the methodology is to 
assign a numerical score to characteristics of poor and non-poor households (“pile 
statements”), such as lack of clothing, lack of food, etc. and to use this value to rank and 
compare households.  The score itself is calculated by the number of times the pile 
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 statements is associated with households in different well-being categories (poor, non-poor, 
etc.), determined in the course of prior well-being ranking exercises.   
 While both of these approaches generate “numbers,” the process of numerical 
transformation is different, as is the policy relevance of the numerical data produced. The 
key difference is that the well-being metric is an inter-subjectively observable brute datum 
in the first case, but not so in the second. Specifically, the ranking of piles is derived from a 
prior ranking of households into well-being categories based on the perceptions of 
participants in the well-being ranking exercise. Unlike the ranking of households on the 
basis of consumption expenditure, this household ranking does not satisfy “subject-
invariance” in that different persons may rank identical households differently for a variety 
of reasons. For example, the household ranked “poorest” in an affluent community could 
very well be ranked “best off” in a richer community.  Consequently, scores generated by 
the Hargreaves techniques will not lead to consistent interpersonal comparisons of well-
being unless there is a high degree of homogeneity in the perceived relationship between 
household characteristics and well-being across the domain of the comparison.xii To 
summarize, then, epistemological differences relating to the privileged unit of knowledge, 
brute data vs. intersubjective meanings, have consequences for the properties of  numbers 
generated in the numerical transformation process, subject-invariant or not, with 
implications for policy-related applications, i.e. making consistent interpersonal 
comparisons.   
Validity Criteria 
 The second difference between empiricism and critical hermeneutics concerns truth 
and validity criteria. Empiricism relies on an observation-based model to establish the truth 
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 or validity of statements in which brute data play a special role. The key issue for our 
purposes concerns the exact nature of this role. 
 For many of the early empiricists, brute-data represented an external “reality”, 
whether ideal or real. Many held a metaphysical conception of truth, closely tied to 
ontological questions about the nature of “reality”. Central to his conception of truth was a 
“similitude” theory of reference: "the relationship between the representations in our minds 
[of brute-data] and the external objects [either ideal or real] that they refer to is literally a 
similarity" (Putnam 1981, p. 57). The immediacy of sense-data served as guarantor of this 
similarity: "we are able to have ideas that refer to our own sensations and this is the 
primary case of reference from an epistemological point of view" (Ibid, p. 64).  
 The rejection of metaphysics as “meaningless” by many logical positivists and 
logical empiricists lead to a shift in emphasis to the non-metaphysical truth, or validity, of 
statements (Ayer 1959, pp. 116, 118-119). The effect was to closely link truth/validity 
criteria to intersubjectively observability. Truth no longer relied on a mysterious relation of 
correspondence to an external reality, nor on a subjective sense of certainty about the 
validity of immediate sense impressions. It was founded on the intersubjectively observable 
and subject-invariant properties of brute-data themselves: “Since the properties ascribed to 
things are observable properties, physicalist language thus is intersubjective, and there is no 
problem in determining the truth [validity] of assertions in physicalist language - one 
merely observes and sees whether the thing has the claimed property” (Suppe 1974, p. 13). 
 Accordingly, determination of the validity of theoretical statements became a 
process of establishing their correspondence to intersubjectively observable, subject-
invariant, physical data. The particular correspondence criteria or rules of choice have been 
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 the subject of considerable debate over the years (Caldwell, 1984). Proposals include strict 
verifiability (logical positivists), whereby all theoretical terms had to be defined in terms of 
an observation vocabulary and individual tested, confirmability (logical empiricists), which 
allows for partial definition of theoretical terms and testing of theoretical systems as a 
whole, and falsifiability (Popper), whereby the derivative hypothesizes of theories are 
subject to critical tests set up to falsify them. While these correspondence criteria differ in 
important respects, they all converge in that brute-data are the referents to which testing is 
applied. 
 Brute data have played a critical role in establishing validity in the consumption 
poverty approach. At the level of data collection, consumption expenditure and actual food 
consumption can be observed and questionnaire responses checked for reporting biases 
(Scott and Amenuvegbe, 1990).xiii At the level of analysis, data on consumption 
expenditure and the poverty line determination may be reviewed and reanalyzed to assess 
say, the validity of empirical statements about poverty levels and trends.xiv In addition, the 
validity of theoretical claims about say, the causal importance of different variables may be 
assessed econometrically through formal hypothesis testing. 
 The critical hermeneutic tradition generally rejects this central role of 
intersubjective observability in establishing validity. The main reason is that narrative 
information generated by dialogic processes plays a much more central role in the analysis. 
There are a number of attempts to formulate truth or validity criteria within critical 
hermeneutics in ways which do not rely on the intersubjective observability requirement. 
For example, one version, propounded by Jürgen Habermas, relies on a consensus theory 
of truth that rests on the premise that truth is the property of a statement which has been 
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 argumentatively, or discursively, validated (Habermas, 1991b). This notion of truth is 
further discussed in the following section when it is applied in the context of normative 
theory.  The key point for our purposes is that the coexistence of different validity criteria 
ends up raising tensions for Q-Squared-type work.  
 A number of the referee reports for this Symposium, and responses by the 
contributors, serve to illustrate this tension. Much of the controversy hinged on the validity 
of narrative information generated in focus groups and semi-structured interviews 
concerning one’s own poverty condition and/or that of others. Some were skeptical about 
the validity of these types of data. xv  For example, on the issue of taboo or difficult 
subjects one referee maintained: “A second interesting claim is that case studies are able to 
get honest answers to difficult questions concerning illegal activities, HIV, anti-social 
behavior. This, too, is an important advantage if it is true. But is it? (Remember Margaret 
Mead in Samoa!).”  
 Another comment of this type concerns the validity of information generated by key 
informants on the food security situation of households within a given area. The referee 
maintained that, “there is no good evidence that they [the key informants] are either 
objective, knowledgeable or capable of making the appropriate judgments and 
assessments.” The authors counter that the above view “challenges 30 years of work on 
participation. Do you really want us to go back to basics on this?!!” 
 Both of these comments relate to issues where there is in principle, an 
intersubjectively observable and physical referent, e.g. HIV status, anti-social behavior, 
food security status, etc. The tension becomes more acute where there is no such obvious 
referent. The point was made clearly by one referee who distinguished between: 
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 “differences with respect to fact …and cases where different perceptions are not 
necessarily a sign of mis-reporting, e.g. differing judgments … perceptions or 
interpretations”.  The latter arises in the context of questions about levels or changes in 
satisfaction or happiness as discussed in the contribution by London et al. Many proponents 
of empiricism express grave concerns with these types of data, on grounds that 
“psychological states … are not verifiable even in principle, since states or attitudes exist 
only in the minds of the individuals” (Bradburn et al., 2004, p.28). 
 Epistemology is deeply relevant to Q-Squared poverty analysis because it bears on 
the types of knowledge which are favored and the types of validity criteria adopted. 
Beneath the conflicting perspectives on particular contributions to the Symposium lie 
debates about the relative merits of inter-subjective observability and discourse-based 
validity criteria. Reconciling these viewpoints entails philosophical not technical analysis.   
 
4. NORMATIVE THEORY 
 The Q-Squared project cannot avoid addressing normative theory at some point. 
The reason is that poverty is value-laden in a direct and immediate way. As such, questions 
arise about the underpinnings of different conceptions of poverty and/or the processes of 
determining their constituent elements. This is the domain of normative theory. 
 The consumption and participatory approaches to poverty draw on different 
traditions of normative theory to arrive at their objects of value, i.e. the conceptions of 
poverty which they use. There is a historical link between consumption poverty and what is 
known as naturalist normative theory. In addition, there are parallels between the 
participatory poverty approach and discursive normative theory, also known as the 
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 “discourse ethics”. The following discussion presents the two traditions and spells out their 
links with the two approaches to poverty. 
 Naturalist normative theory attempts to ground evaluative claims in empirical fact. 
There are a number of ways to do this, referred to as naturalizing stratagems (Harman, 
1977). Following the terminology in Section 3, we refer to the main naturalizing stratagem 
used in the bodies of theory underlying the consumption poverty approach as the “brute 
data grounding”.  
 The brute data grounding aims to derive of the object of moral or prudential value 
from sensory experience or observation. Historically, there have been two main variants, 
which correspond to the two conceptions of brute data discussed in Section 3.  Originally, 
the object of value was a “sense” datum, known either by introspection, observation, or 
everyday experience. Subsequently, it became an intersubjectively observable physical 
datum.  
 The main historical figure in the development of naturalist normative theory is 
David Hume. There is a clear historical link between Hume and the consumption poverty 
approach, which runs through Jeremy Bentham (1823) and some of the founders of utility 
theory (Shaffer, 2002). Hume attempted to derive the object of moral value (virtue) from 
sensory experience. In his discussion of virtue and vice Hume (1988, p. 468-9) writes : “ … 
see if you can find the matter of fact or real existence which you call vice… you will never 
find it till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of 
disapprobation, which arises in you towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but “tis the 
object of feeling, not reason”  
20 
  Hume’s empiricist epistemology and methodology greatly influenced his normative 
thinking. Brute data provided the informational base for “the experimental method” that he 
sought to introduce to the study of ethics: “… we can only expect success by following the 
experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular 
instances … It is full time … [to] reject every system of ethics, however subtle or 
ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation” (Hume 1902, p. 174-5).xvi
 Bentham paid glowing tribute to Hume as an important intellectual source of his 
moral theory (Baumgardt 1966, pp. 42-43). Bentham followed Hume in grounding his core 
evaluative standard, the principle of utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle, in human 
sentiment. Both sought to construct normative theory without recourse to non-empirical 
entities. Bentham ([1823] 1948, p. 18) argued in favor of the Greatest Happiness Principle 
because it “is clearer, as referring more explicitly to pain and pleasure”. Further, he 
maintained that pleasure and pain are directly measurable so that evaluative judgments 
could be made according to an intersubjectively observable “felicific calculus” (Ibid, 29).   
 Modern utility theory drops the mental state of happiness or pleasure in favor of the 
observable state of preference fulfillment. Paul Samuelson is the central figure. He 
developed revealed preference theory and was an advocate of money metric utility 
(Samuelson, 1966). Samuelson (1974, p. 1262), maintained that money metric utility is 
“objectively measurable” and “defined behaviouristically” by virtue of revealed preference 
theory. Revealed preference theory rendered preferences intersubjectively observable and 
money metric utility allegedly restored interpersonal comparability to utility following its 
earlier rejection as unscientific (Robbins, 1962, pp. 138-9).  
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  As discussed in the previous section, the brute data grounding is quite integral to the 
consumption poverty approach. The derivation of the poverty line, revelation of 
preferences, and interpersonal comparisons of well-being, are all conducted in 
intersubjectively observable fashion. In addition, the ensuing framework facilitates 
intersubjectively observable assessment of the validity of consumption data, simple 
empirical statements about the level and trends of poverty and theoretical claims about say, 
the causes of poverty.  
  Discursive normative theory arose in close association with the works of Jürgen 
Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel. There is no direct historical link between discursive 
normative theory and the participatory approach though parallels exist between the two. 
Specifically, they both require that an actual dialogue be conducted to arrive at normative 
conclusions, such as the relevant conception of poverty to adopt. Further, there is growing 
acceptance of the importance of using something akin to the idea of an ideal speech 
community to validate discursive outcomes. 
This tradition of normative theory finds its grounding in discourse, i.e., an actual 
discussion among participants in dialog. It rejects the “monological” identification of 
particular objects of value such as happiness or preference fulfillment, which “tend to 
ontologically favor some particular type of ethical life” (Habermas 1991, p. 121). Instead, it 
lays out a procedural metanorm about how normative disputes are to be adjudicated 
without specifying the contents of any ensuing agreements. 
 There is an elaborate theoretical edifice underpinning Habermas’s version of 
discursive normative theory.xvii To simplify, it combines the principles of universalization 
and discourse both of which are supported by a “transcendental pragmatic” theory of 
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 argumentation. The central feature of the transcendental pragmatic argument is its attempt 
to derive the rules of normative discourse from the properties of speech. The 
universalization principle maintains that for a norm to be valid: “all affected can accept the 
consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the 
satisfaction of everyone’s interests” (Habermas 1991a, p. 65). It requires that an actual 
dialogue take place, whose idealized referent is the idea of “ideal role taking” or an “ideal 
speech situation” whereby everyone has the competence, opportunity and freedom to fully 
participate in dialog. The discourse principle makes the additional claim that dialogue is a 
necessary means of arriving at normative conclusions: “Only those norms can claim to be 
valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as 
participants in practical discourse” (Ibid, p. 66). 
 The key point is that the discourse ethics has parallels with aspects of the 
participatory approach to poverty.xviii An actual dialogue is required to determine the 
dimensions of poverty in which viewpoints are subject to critical review by participants. 
Further, there has been increasing recognition of the elusiveness of “true” participation 
given asymmetries of power, knowledge, ability, etc. among participants (Mosse, 1994). As 
a result, a number of techniques have been developed to facilitate greater participation, i.e. 
to approximate an ideal speech situation, including improved identification procedures of 
“invisible” groups, separate and/or smaller discussions with marginal groups, role plays 
where issues of power are subtly addressed through the exchange of social roles (Brock and 
McGee, 2002).  
 What is the relevance for Q-Squared? The reliance on different traditions of 
normative theory poses tensions for the Q-Squared initiative because different approaches 
23 
 to poverty are likely to favor different dimensions of poverty. One example is Shaffer’s 
(1998) study from the Republic of Guinea.  According to standard national household 
survey data women are not more likely than men to be consumption poor or to suffer 
greater consumption poverty. The incidence, intensity, and severity of poverty is lower in 
female-headed households than male-headed households. Sensitivity analysis using 
different adult equivalence scales and different poverty lines (stochastic dominance tests) 
affirms this result. In addition, both women and all females are under-represented, relative 
to their share in the population, in poor and ultra-poor households. Further, most indicators 
of intra-household distribution of food or health care (nutritional outcome and mortality 
indicators, aggregate female-male ratio) reveal that men or boys are worse off than girls or 
women.xix PPA data from the village of Kamatiguia in Upper Guinea, however, suggest 
that women as a group are worse off than men as a group. In group discussions, a 
substantial majority of men and women maintained that women were “worse off” than 
men, and a larger majority held that in a second life they would prefer to be born male than 
female. Further, in well-being ranking exercises, groups of both men and women separately 
ranked all but two married village women below all male household heads in terms of their 
own criteria of well-/ill-being. According to participants this finding has to do with two 
dimensions of deprivation that disproportionately affect women, and are not well captured 
in consumption poverty: excessive work load and restricted decision-making authority. 
The tension that arises for Q-Squared type analyses is that as more and more 
dimensions of poverty arise, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine their relative 
importance for policy-related purposes, such as targeting or resource allocation. While 
there are statistical techniques to perform multidimensional poverty analysis, such as 
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 factorial analysis (Asselin 2002), statistical valuation is different from the normative 
valuation which underlies well-being rankings.  The problem is compounded when dealing 
with aspects of poverty, such as lack of respect or dignity, which are difficult to 
operationalise in the same way as say, consumption.   
A related set of problems, already alluded to, concerns interpersonal comparisons of 
well-being and aggregation of persons below the poverty line when using conceptions of 
poverty generated by participants in dialogue. If different conceptions of poverty are 
favored in different sites, the basis for interpersonal comparisons and aggregation is not 
obvious. It is interesting to note how this issue is handled by those contributions in the 
Symposium which attempted to compare and aggregate people’s perceptions of poverty.  
A first approach, adopted by Barahona and Levy, is simply to take one dimension 
of well-being which figured prominently in previously conducted well-being rankings, food 
security, standardize its definition and include it in a subsequent community census. While 
the authors argue that poverty definitions “should be developed through discussion with 
communities about how they see poverty”, they opted for a “proxy of poverty” in order to 
meet requirements of standardization.  A second approach, adopted by Sharp, is to impose 
a multidimensional conception of deprivation, comprising elements such as access to 
livelihood resources and household independence, and to include this within a self-
assessment module with standardized categories in a household survey. As above, the 
approach is designed to be “as far as possible, comparable across sites rather than a relative 
ranking with the community”. A third approach by Hargreaves assigns a numerical value to 
characteristics of the poor generated from well-being rankings and uses this information to 
construct household wealth and poverty indices and to make interpersonal comparisons.  
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 As discussed in Section 3, the Hargreaves approach will only allow for consistent 
interpersonal comparisons if there is a great deal of homogeneity across sites in the 
perceived relationship between household characteristics and well-being or wealth.  A final 
approach is that of Howe and McKay who maintain that there is enough homogeneity 
across well-being rankings to identify certain meaningful characteristics of poverty groups, 
which can then be mapped onto “standard” household survey data for purposes of 
aggregation and comparison. As the author’s note, however, the resulting is an 
approximation in that only some of the characteristics of the poor from the PRA rankings 
can be used and the categories themselves represent fairly broad generalizations across 
many different regions and groups.  
Normative theory matters for Q-Squared poverty analysis because different 
theoretical traditions tend to favor different conceptions or dimensions of poverty.  While 
there are ways to deal with this, all involve tradeoffs between retaining the 
comprehensiveness and richness of people’s perceptions of well-being on the one hand and 
meeting the requirements of standardization to make consistent interpersonal comparisons 
of well-being, on the other. The tensions are at root philosophical and not amenable to an 
easy technical fix. 
  
5. CONCLUSION 
 The turn toward the use of mixed qualitative and quantitative (Q-Squared) methods 
in the analysis of poverty is long overdue. We believe that the contributions to this 
Symposium make a strong case for the value-added in opting for a Q-Squared approach. 
We also believe that the process of mixing is not seamless but that, at bottom, tensions 
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 remain. Two sources of tension, relating to epistemology and normative theory have been 
identified, with implications for the numerical transformation of data, the selection of 
validity criteria, and the conception/dimension of poverty adopted and interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being.  
 The objective here is not simply to make the point that philosophical assumptions 
“matter” for practice. It is to improve practice by teasing out a number of implications for 
applied poverty analysis. Two issues seem particularly germane.     
 First, concerning validity criteria, there is scope to incorporate some of the features 
of validity criteria based on intersubjective observability into dialogic/qualitative inquiry. 
To recall, intersubjective observability was an attempt to facilitate “subject-invariance”, so 
that research results should not depend on whoever happened to be undertaking the 
research exercise. Otherwise stated, validity is closely linked to concerns of reliability and 
replicability in the empiricist tradition. One way to bring these same considerations into 
dialogic analyses is presented in the contribution by Hargreaves et al. In their study, all 
well-being rankings were conducted on three occasions by different facilitators and the 
average score of the three exercises used to rank households. In this way, the undue 
influence of any one facilitator is reduced and the statistical agreement between the 
rankings of different facilitators can be assessed using an intra-cluster correlation 
coefficient.xx The effect is to provide a clearer basis for determining the validity of results 
by assessing their reliability. 
  A second related point concerns standardization as a means of ensuring validity. 
The standardization of questions was already discussed in the previous section as a means 
of ensuring the comparability of findings across population groups. In the cases of fixed 
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 response questionnaires, considerable attention has also been given to standardizing 
questionnaire administration so that all questions are asked exactly in the same way. This is 
near impossible to do in say, focus groups or semistructured interviews because responses 
are not known in advance. In these cases, it is useful to standardize at the level of the 
dialogic encounter to enhance validity, relying on some notion of an ideal speech situation. 
An example, involving an integrated impact assessment of a major anti-poverty program in 
Vietnam, illustrates the point (Shaffer/IDEA Intl, 2003).   
   One component of the impact assessment was a nationally representative 
“qualitative” survey which combined open-ended and fixed response questions about 
project impact. The first draft of the survey guide contained standard instructions about the 
importance of reading each question exactly as it appeared, in the same sequence, with the 
same emphasis, etc. It soon became apparent that this would not work for the open-ended 
questions as it was impossible to predict the follow-up probes in advance. As a result, it 
was decided to draft lists of “positive” and “negative” probes intended to identify processes 
leading to positive and negative impact respectively. While it was impossible to specify the 
exact probes to use, as this would depend on how the discussion evolved, it was possible to 
ensure a balance of negative and positive probes for all questions. As a practical matter, 
more attention should focus on the requirements of approximating an ideal speech situation 
through the standardization and replication of techniques designed to generate balanced and 
wide ranging dialogue.  
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i The Q-Squared Conferences at Cornell, March 15-16, 2001 and the University of Toronto, May 15-16, 2004 
as well as the Conference on Combining Conference on Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in 
Development Research, University of Wales, Swansea, July 1-2, 2002.  
ii Appleton and Booth (2001), Bevan and Joireman (1997), Booth et al.. (1998), Carvalho and White (1997),  
Harriss (2002), White (2002). 
iii Exceptions include Booth (2002) and Campbell (2005).  
iv Some argue that there are important ontological differences, about the nature of reality, between qualitative 
and quantitative approaches, though linkages between epistemology and ontology are not straight forward. It 
should be recalled, that one of the most famous ontological idealists, Bishop Berkeley, was also an 
epistemological empiricist.  
v Sections 2-4 of this article draw on Shaffer (2002) and (2005). 
vi One such example is the Village Studies Program, 1970-75, directed by Michael Lipton at the Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex (Lipton, 1992). 
vii It should be noted though Lazarsfeld is often associated with the introduction of surveying and statistical 
analysis in sociology,  he was a consistent advocate of the combined use of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches (see Boudon, 1993) 
viii The participatory approach to poverty had drawn heavily on the seminal work of Robert Chambers (1983) 
among others. 
ix The major difference, for the present purposes, is that social anthropology has emphasized both the 
observation of behavior (the etic) as well as the understanding of meanings and beliefs (the emic). A major 
preoccupation is to analyze the often conflicting information coming from each (Booth et al., 1999 and Rew 
et al.,. this issue). This emphasis on intersubjective observability, through techniques of participant 
observation, is one reason that some of the founders of anthropology considered the new discipline to be 
empiricist in the sense used in this paper (Wright and Nelson 1995, pp. 43-51).  Other differences between the 
two traditions are discussed in Green (2004). 
x The use of techniques of nutrition science was brought into the modern analysis of consumption poverty by 
Rowntree (1980) who relied upon estimates derived by the nutritionist Atwater to calculate the minimal 
37 
                                                                                                                                                     
caloric requirements of male adult equivalents as well as the caloric value of different foodstuffs in order to 
determine minimal food costs. Nutrition science provides an intersubjectively observable way of defining an 
adequacy level of well-being, the poverty line, a fact which has been explicitly invoked by its proponents 
such as Orshansky (1965, p. 5), though it appears that political considerations were quite integral to the 
latter’s choice of methods (Fisher, 1992). 
xi There are many technical issues involved here, such as adjusting for price, consumption and household 
composition differences, which can lead to different results depending on how they are tackled (e.g. 
Ravallion, 1996). Further, to guarantee consistency across persons a number of assumptions are required 
which may be violated in practice (Ravallion, 2003). 
xii Hargreaves et al., acknowledge this point when they note that intercommunity comparability hinges on an 
“intrinsic link” between wealth/well-being and household characteristics. 
xiii It should be explicitly acknowledged that the reliance on self-reports of consumption from household 
surveys, rather than observations of actual consumption, marks a departure from the empiricist tradition. This 
is second best option adopted for practical purposes within an empiricist theoretic framework. As such, it 
differs from the discussion below.  
xiv  Though see note xi. 
xv For this critique applied to “subjective” questions in surveys see Sudman et al. (1996) and Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) and more generally, Elster (1987). 
xvi In practice Hume’s “experiments” were really thought exercises that relied heavily on introspective 
evidence or ordinary experience (Noxon 1973, pp. 116-23) 
xvii See Habermas (1991a) and Rehg (1994). 
xviii It should be noted that the idea of an idea speech situation rests on many assumptions which are never 
achieved in practice. Nevertheless, it serves as a regulative ideal or standard against which the validity of 
discursive outcomes may be assessed (Forester, 1985). In addition, following Benhabib (1992, pp. 30-1, 74-
5), the present argument drops Habermas’ (1991b, pp. 177-82) insistence that the discourse ethics applies 
only to moral issues of justice and not to evaluative issues of the good or bad life, i.e. poverty.  
xix The one exception relates to infant mortality indicators when using “relative-difference” or model life table 
norms. 
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xx This is analogous to techniques used in anthropology for estimating intercoder reliability and determining if 
the agreement between coders is due to chance, such as Cohen’s kappa (Bernard, 2002, pp. 480-483.) 
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